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1 Introduction
Social protection schemes are embedded in the
wider socioeconomic context of welfare regimes.
This has been a key insight from the welfare
state debate in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries.
In non-OECD countries, where the state plays a
smaller role in the provision of welfare, we might
talk about ‘welfare regimes’ rather than ‘welfare
state regimes’ (Gough 2004).1 Building on this
analysis, this article introduces the concepts of
‘welfare trajectories’ to capture the historicity of
welfare development, and ‘reproduction
patterns’ to explain institutional stability or
change in welfare arrangements.
After introducing our analytical framework, this
article presents an analysis of institutional
legacies of the Indian welfare regime. Since
independence, the Republic of India has aspired
to achieve welfare and greater equality for its
citizens, yet its welfare trajectory has been torn
between these universal ideals and fragmented
political and social realities. This article identifies
the mechanisms which obstructed the
constitutional commitment to greater welfare for
all citizens, and suggests that, after
independence, existing inequalities were not
successfully tackled. The failure to achieve
egalitarian citizenship created a reproduction
pattern which worked against the development of
comprehensive social welfare provision. Instead,
the politics of ‘political society’ (Chatterjee 2004)
helped perpetuate inequalities and introduced
hundreds of social welfare-related programmes
which produced selective and temporary gains
only for specific groups. Nevertheless, the recent
swing towards social rights-based legislation
might constitute a shift that shakes this pattern
of reproduction and allows for greater
institutional change in the future.
2 The analytical framework: welfare trajectories
The concept of welfare trajectories draws on two
important sources: the debate on welfare
regimes in the South (Gough 2004; Rudra 2007;
Haggard and Kaufman 2008), and historical
institutional analysis (Thelen 1999). The former
explores the systematic differences between
welfare regimes in countries outside the OECD.
The origins of such regimes and social policy
development, according to Gough (2008: 58), can
be analysed using the framework of the ‘five Is’:
Industrialisation, Interests, Institutions, Ideas
and International supra-state influences. Gough
(2008: 63) stresses that social policy
developments are embedded in economic and
social structures and have to be analysed in their
specific context. Rudra (2007: 391) highlights
that ‘the initial choice of development strategy
and complementary welfare policies create
distributional coalitions, which thereafter have a
vested interest in maintaining existing
institutions and reinforcing them’. Haggard and
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Kaufman (2008: 15) add that ‘the effects of
institutions are conditional on the distribution of
underlying preferences over the policy in
question and the strength of the contending
social groups in the political process’. They
conclude that the legacy of early social policies
weighs heavily and limits the room for
manoeuvre of today’s actors in the field.
To understand institutional stability and change
of today’s welfare regimes, this article
conceptualises them as welfare trajectories, which
can be analysed using the approach of historical
institutionalism. The approach includes two
related, but analytically distinct, claims (Thelen
1999). First, the initial choice of policies in
founding moments of institutional formation
shape distinct development paths – the critical
junctures. Second, institutional stability and
change are constrained by past trajectories
through patterns of reproduction, which have two
components: incentive structures that guide
individual and collective practices to sustain
institutions or regulatory regimes, and
distributional effects of institutions that
reproduce and magnify the political distribution
of power. Depending on the set of mechanisms on
which an institution rests, it may be more or less
prone to change. Understanding fundamental
institutional change therefore requires an insight
into the previous reproduction patterns which
upheld earlier regulatory regimes.
3 The formation of India’s nascent welfare regime
The formulation of India’s Constitution and the
social and economic planning in the first years of
the republic were critical junctures for the
institutionalisation of India’s welfare trajectory,
because self-governance was seen as more than a
moral right: ‘political freedom must include real
economic freedom of the starving masses’
(Congress 1931, cited in Kumar 2005: 338),
according to the Indian National Congress.
Hence, significant expectations were attached to
the Constitution and the new republic. It took
the over 300 members of the Constituents
Assembly over three years to mould competing
ideas on the role of the state, democracy,
economy, religion, language and welfare into the
Constitution’s unified format (Guha 2007:
103–23). The first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, and the Planning Commissions then
shaped economic and social policies in a way
which set the course of the welfare trajectory.
To understand the formation of the early social
policy regime, we turn to the social question and
the way it was initially framed in these two
crucial phases, when two issues dominated the
discussion: whether welfare should be group-
based and group-specific or universalist, and
whether a more interventionist social policy
agenda should be favoured over welfare
development driven by economic modernisation.
3.1 Group-based versus universal welfare provision
Concerning welfare, as in other policy areas,
traditions and hereditary ideologies rival
modernising ideals. In pre-colonial and colonial
times, the organisation of social welfare in India
was fragmented, often charity- and group-based;
for the Hindus within castes, for other religious
communities mainly within a more broadly
defined group of members (Muzumdar 1964).
While the Muslim tradition of zakat entails
mechanisms of redistribution in favour of the
disadvantaged; the rigid hierarchical social order
between castes involves extreme forms of social
exclusion (Jürgenmeyer and Rösel 2009).
After long discussions, the constitution of the
‘sovereign, socialist, secular democratic Republic
of India’ foresaw replacing these community
bonds with the state’s responsibility for social
welfare of the individual citizen. The social
objectives as laid out in the ‘Directive Principles
of State Policy’ reflect the state’s commitment to
promote the welfare of the people and secure for
its citizens: ‘the right to an adequate means of
livelihood’. Inequalities between individuals and
groups in income, status, between castes and
regions were to be minimised. Labels and
ascribed statuses such as ‘untouchables’ were
officially abolished. The Republic committed
itself clearly to the universal ideals of justice,
liberty, equality and fraternity in its
constitutional preamble. But the ideals and
Directive principles only set guidelines for
policymaking and were not directly enforceable
by courts. Additionally, the state’s activities in
the field of welfare, the rights to work,
education, and public assistance were conditional
upon the availability of resources, upon ‘the
limits of its economic capacity and development’.
An exception to these limitations was established
for communities of scheduled castes (SC), the
former untouchables or Dalits, and scheduled
tribes (ST), India’s indigenous communities, for
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whom national welfare commissions were set up.
The SC and ST were, moreover, assured of a
reservation of seats in all legislative bodies from
municipal to central level and quotas in public
service as well as educational institutions. A key
advocate for these affirmative action policies was
Bhimrao Ambedkar, leader of the Dalits in the
independence movement, president of the
Drafting Committee of India’s constitution, and
later the first Minister of Law. Ambedkar (2008
[1946]) insisted that both would be needed:
universal citizenship rights and special provisions
for the SC/ST communities, ‘rights are nothing
unless remedies are provided whereby people can
seek to obtain redress when rights are invaded’.
The questions of untouchability and
indigenousness thus gained momentum among
politicians and moved centre-stage in the social
question. In the case of the SC/ST, their earlier
social and economic exclusion, as well as
continuing discrimination, was successfully
framed as an injustice that demanded remedy
through state action. In favour of these most
disadvantaged groups, a deviation from the
principles of universality was made. Although the
Constituents Assembly was aware of other
reasons for marginalisation, such as gender,
religious minority groups or regional origin,
despite lengthy debates, no special provisions
were made for other marginalised groups at the
time (Guha 2007: 111).
3.2 Welfare through economic modernisation
How was greater welfare to be achieved for
India’s population? Corbridge et al. (2005: 54)
point out that early conceptions of poverty and
measures to tackle it were defined broadly. The
state was to become the ‘provider, protector and
promoter’ for the underprivileged millions. On
the other hand, key actors of the time attributed
the structural causes of poverty and hunger
essentially to India’s history and economic
structures; to the ‘legacy of “a traditional society
and static economy in the past, petrified to some
extent by colonial rule”’. If India was to be
remade it needed to ‘throw off the shackles of
tradition’ (Planning Commission 1961, cited in
Corbridge et al. 2005: 53).
The subsequent economic reforms essentially
shared the British sentiments of ‘native’ origins
of poverty. They aimed at the development of a
modern economy built on domestic (heavy)
industries. They thereby failed to reach nearly
three-quarters of the workforce, who were
engaged in agriculture and contributed 60 per
cent to India’s GDP (Guha 2007: 201).
Consequently, a domestic consumer market did
not develop, which impeded further growth of
industries (Ghosh 2004). The failure to include
wider sections of the workforce in the formal
labour market also meant that employment-
based social security provision remained limited
in coverage. Such schemes had already been
established under British colonial administration,
but had hardly gone beyond the ‘small segment of
the population whose contentment was
particularly important for the colonial powers to
stabilise their rule’ (Loewe 2009).2 In the young
Republic of India, these policies were extended to
public employees in industries and services for
whom more extensive social welfare schemes and
labour rights were introduced, notably the
Employees State Insurance Act of 1948. However,
‘social policy which ensured the provision of basic
needs to the entire population was never a
priority’, concludes Ghosh (2004: 293). For the
majority, social programmes remained residual in
character (de Haan and Sabharwal 2008). A more
interventionist social policy agenda, as
propagated by Ambedkar, was defeated by
Nehru’s economic modernisation approach
coupled with the belief in economic self-reliance
or swadeshi, as advocated by Mohandas Gandhi.
3.3 The social question unresolved
India’s welfare regime, around the time of its
inception, was thus already torn between its
universal ideals and inegalitarian traditions, as
well as between a reliance on economic
modernisation and the perceived limits of its
economic capacities. The post-independence
welfare regime was marked by a ‘high level of
social tolerance for high and growing asset
inequality, persistent poverty and low levels of
human development among vast sections of the
population, especially in the rural areas’ (Ghosh
2004: 293; also see de Haan and Sabharwal 2008:
71). In the absence of comprehensive welfare
policies, the provision of welfare and social
security for the majority remained largely in the
hands of the traditional institutions of family,
village and caste, as well as other religious
communities. The Indian state, which
propagated state responsibility for the welfare of
its constituency, thereby revealed that its
redistributive capacity remained limited.
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4 Reproducing fragmentation: the logic of
political society
From critical junctures, we now turn to the
reproduction patterns of India’s post-
independence welfare trajectory, i.e. the
mechanisms that impeded the constitutional call
for greater welfare and equality, drawing on
Partha Chatterjee’s concepts of civil and political
society. Chatterjee (2004) highlights the apparent
paradox that the ideal of equal citizenship, which
is meant to overcome inequality, can actually
produce and perpetuate inequalities. He argues
that state and society formation in the former
colonies are influenced by Western modernity. The
encounter with the ideals of democracy and
nationhood led to the formation of formally
democratic nation-states. But the new democratic
political institutions ‘cannot be made to work
effectively merely by legislating them into
existence’; they need to be sustained by a ‘network
of norms in civil society that prevail independently
of the state and that are consistent with its laws’
(Chatterjee 2004: 33). Modern political
communities rely on (pre-political) foundations:
citizens, who ‘sustain freedom and equality in the
political domain’, who deal with the state, based on
the principles of ‘equality, autonomy, freedom of
entry and exit, contract, deliberative procedures of
decision-making, recognised rights and duties of
members’ (Chatterjee 2010 [1997]: 168).
In countries like India, it is only a ‘small section
of culturally equipped citizens’ that forms civil
society. Despite the fact that according to the
‘formal structure of the state… all of society is
civil society; everyone is a citizen… [m]ost of the
inhabitants of India are only tenuously and even
then ambiguously and contextually, rights
bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the
constitution’ (Chatterjee 2010 [1997]: 38). This
large share of the populace forms political society.
As opposed to civil society, political society cannot
deal with the state on the grounds of universal
ideals, because often their livelihood is built on
circumvention of the formal law. The violation of
health and safety norms in the unorganised
sector, or of property rights by slum dwellers, may
be perceived as a matter of right to make a living,
but their organisations cannot be recognised on a
par with civic organisations, which operate in the
legal mainstream. The politics of political society
are therefore always contextual, temporary and
strategic; normatively, they are not bound to
universal ideals.
The distinction between political and civil society
characterises ‘two styles of political engagement that
are available to people – the former style is more
available to an urbanised elite, the latter to the
rest. The availability is fluid and contextual and
not fixed by class’ (Menon 2010: 11, emphasis in
original). The different styles of politics available
to civil and political society can be understood as
a pattern of reproduction that shaped the Indian
welfare regime, because these styles of politics
work as reproduction mechanisms as described
by Thelen (1999).
4.1 Incentive structures
First, the politics of civil and political society can
be analysed as incentive structures, to which
‘actors adapt their strategies in ways that reflect
but also reinforce the “logic” of the system’
(Thelen 1999: 392). If the strategic politics of
political society are more successful in securing
(temporary) gains for its members than civil
society politics, and strategic politics therefore
become the preferred way of interaction with the
state, strategic politics work as incentive
structures.
According to Chatterjee (2004), this is the case:
despite the transitory and selective nature of
strategic politics, political society – more effectively
than civil society – does politics for the
marginalised. However, this is only acceptable
from an outcome-based idea of democratic
institutions, which denotes a shift from
government of and by the people, to government
for the people. Chatterjee argues that government
has been turned into technocratic governance,
which promises to realise more welfare for more
people at smaller cost. The delivery of welfare has
become such a successful legitimacy-generating
mechanism of the state, it has replaced citizen
participation and deliberation (also see Arora
2004: 330; Kumar 2005: 343).
4.2 Distributional effects
Thelen (1999: 394) points to a second
reproduction mechanism of democratic
institutions, which lies in their distributional
effects that replicate and magnify particular
patterns of power distribution in politics, so that
some groups are empowered while others are
disarticulated and marginalised. Such a
structural advantage has been given to civil
society. When civil society in the form of, for
example unionised workers, demands health and
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safety regulations at the workplace and access to
state-organised social security, they can present
these as comprehensive, universal or egalitarian
demands. But the benefits from any such changes
will only go to a minority of workers as long as 93
per cent of India’s workforce is in the unorganised
sector and such regulations are effectively not
applicable for them. The politics of civil society
may seem universal, but in fact they disarticulate
the demands of marginalised groups.
Consequently, welfare provisioning ‘has not been
universal in terms of its actual effects, even when
it has been declared as such’ (Ghosh 2004: 293).
The claims on government welfare programmes
of poor peasants, landless rural workers and daily
wage labourers in the cities also needs to be
recognised by state agencies. But Chatterjee
(2004: 40) stresses that ‘those claims could not
be regarded as justiciable rights since the state
did not have the means to deliver those benefits
to the entire population of the country’. In these
circumstances, political society has to, and does,
find other ways of securing access to welfare,
through strategic politics. It does so by making
claims for exceptions or preferential treatments.
The resulting social policy ‘has been directed to
specific (and restricted) target groups’ (Ghosh
2004: 293; Arora 2004). Consequently, literally
several hundred social programmes at central
and state level emerged, often with overlapping,
though narrowly defined target groups – and
with little knowledge about these programmes
among potential beneficiaries (de Haan 2008).
The multiplicity of social programmes can be
read as evidence for successful political society
engagement, which ensured material gains and
concessions to particular groupings. In sum, the
strategic politics of political society and the only
seemingly universal politics of civil society can be
seen as a plausible pattern of reproduction, as
the sum of incentives for and distributional
effects of collective and individual practices,
which foster a trajectory of fragmented social
and welfare policies in India.
5 Changing patterns?
In recent years, this pattern has been confronted
with a challenge. Since the general election of
2004 and the formation of the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, even
although not always on its initiative,3 there has
been a shift towards social rights-based policies.
Well-known examples are the Right to
Information Act (2005), the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA) (2005) and the Right to Education
Act (2009).
The rights-based paradigm has been heralded as
a major change by activists and as a sign that
‘India’s underprivileged majority is not
completely marginalised in this elitist political
system’ (Drèze 2010: 511). It is taken as an
indicator that those who have traditionally not
necessarily benefited from a rights discourse,
have now successfully employed such.
To Chatterjee, a social rights-based legislation
might be civil society politics, and he might
question whether parts of the marginalised
population can apply civil society measures truly
in their favour. He contends that where
governmental activities take place ‘within the
stratified social structures of class, status and
privilege’ (Chatterjee 2004: 66), the benefits
consequently go to those with greater knowledge.
Political society, according to him, needs to
challenge the governmental technologies, which
would otherwise ‘continue to proliferate and
serve, much as they did in the colonial era, as
manipulable instruments of class rule in a global
capitalist order’ (Chatterjee 2004: 25).
Chatterjee admittedly touches a sensitive issue
when he says that civil society politics and
seemingly universal policies produce and
perpetuate inequalities. His concept does serve as
a useful construct to understand the fractioned
nature of welfare policies in India. But can the
politics of political society really be understood as a
potential for ‘expansion of democratic political
participation’ (Chatterjee 2004: 76), as he claims?
Procedural democracy, for Chatterjee, is linked in
many ways to civil society and its politics, and he
does not necessarily expect political society to
follow its rules. But he fails to explain whether and
how the clan leaders or power-brokers that act as
spokespersons for political society will act on
behalf of the most marginalised. It is also worth
questioning the primarily output-based legitimacy
of strategic politics. Whether political society can
deliver welfare better in the long run is uncertain,
because inequalities are perpetuated in its
heterogeneous social constellations. The politics of
political society do not offer a sustainable way out,
but sustain this welfare regime.
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If rights-based policies are to challenge the
mechanisms of political society, this poses a
double challenge. The pattern that purportedly
universal policies benefit the few who are already
privileged needs to be overcome. But even
effectively implemented universal policies with a
better performance would only question and
potentially delegitimise the output-based
argument. To turn around the unfavourable
reproduction mechanisms of civil and political
society politics, that have sustained the
fragmented welfare regime for too long, more
drastic changes in the working of Indian
democracy are needed. This task cannot be
achieved by social protection policies alone. The
community-based nature of the MGNREGA,
with its emphasis on local decision-making, social
audit and transparency guarantees might point
to the right direction. Yet, several studies
highlight that much remains to be done
concerning both equal inputs of citizens and
more equitable outputs (see Drèze 2010; Ehmke
2011).
6 Conclusion
In terms of social policymaking, this article
suggests that it is a narrow path between universal
policies that treat unequals as equal, and giving in
to the plurality of particular demands. In the
Indian context, an adverse combination of both
produces socially unjust outcomes. The
heterogeneity of political society and its politics
have been an obstacle for the formation of a
common horizon of solidarity. Together with the
only ostensibly universal politics of civil society,
they formed a reproduction pattern which did not
challenge the historically high acceptance of
inequalities, and these continue to form an
impediment to redistributive policies. This pattern
obstructed the realisation of the constitutional
commitment to greater welfare. If this pattern was
to be overcome by a rights- and citizen-based
approach, it would offer opportunities for more
substantial institutional change of India’s social
policy in the future. It could be a turning point in
India’s history of fragmented and overlapping
organisation of welfare.
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Notes
* I want to thank Stephen Devereux, Gabriele
Koehler, Daniel Leisegang, Rachel Sabates-
Wheeler, Lisbeth Zimmermann and
participants at the conference ‘Social
Protection for Social Justice’ for comments on
earlier versions of this article. All remaining
errors are mine.
1 Gough and his co-authors identify three
‘meta-regime’ types: proto-welfare state
regimes, informal security regimes and
insecurity regimes, which differ from the
OECD welfare states in four fields (Gough
2004: 26). First, state institutions are less
autonomous and democratic practice might be
absent. Market capitalism is not necessarily
the dominant form of economic organisation.
Second, in the South, the trio of state, market
and family has to be extended to include
community, which is a fourth major source of
welfare production, and each of these four
also has an international dimension. Third,
welfare outcomes tend to be generally lower
than in OECD countries for at least the
biggest part of the population. Fourth,
political mobilisation of elites and other
societal groups, as well as stratification, differ
from the Global North.
2 The English, who had been among the first
nations to install a ‘poor relief ’ at home,
reacted to urban poverty in India with
containment, and the problem of the rural
poor was perceived as a result of their
backwardness, untouchability and of
‘Indianness’ itself (Corbridge et al. 2005: 52).
Although British rule had partially eroded the
old economic order and decreased the ability
of the population to secure self-sufficiency, the
cause of poverty was not attributed to the new
(colonial) but to the traditional economic
regime.
3 Another active role was played by India’s
Supreme Court, its proactive judiciary has
been vital for the extension of social rights,
for example the right to a mid-day meal at
school for pupils (Chandhoke 2007).
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